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Jurisdiction 
This matter involves an appeal from a district court divorce case. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(h). 
Issues Presented for Review 
1. Did the district court err in awarding Respondent a future interest in a 
defined benefit retirement when the parties had agreed, and the court had 
accepted, the parties' agreement to credit the value of such an account against 
the property division of the marital estate? The issue was addressed at trial on 
April 23, 2004, (Apr. 23, 2004 Tr. at 19-20), and in subsequent hearings on 
December 9, 2004 (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 53-56) and October 31, 2005, (October 
31, 2005 Tr. at 23-47.) A trial court's property distribution in a divorce decree is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 
(Utah 1988). 
2. Did the district court err in making a supplemental divorce decree 
retroactive to the date of the trial where there was no basis for entry of the order 
nunc pro tunc? The issue was never discussed at any hearing. Instead, the 
retroactivity language was included in the supplemental divorce decree and 
Respondent did not have an opportunity to raise it with the trial court. This issue 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See, Maxwell v. Maxwell. 796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Controlling Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-1. 
(Exhibit A, Text of Controlling Statutes) 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal challenging the division of assets from the final order of 
the district court in a divorce proceeding. 
Course of Proceedings1 
On August 26,1999, Petitioner filed a verified petition for divorce. 
Following protracted discovery, changes in attorneys, and multiple Orders to 
Show Cause, the matter came for trial before the district court for a four day 
bench trial from April 20-23, 2004. The judge made oral findings following trial on 
April 23, 2004. Subsequently, an Order to Show Cause, further discovery, and 
numerous objections were filed to the language of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Petitioner's counsel. The district court's Decree 
of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce were finally entered on August 28, 2006. (Exhibit B, Decree of 
Divorce; Exhibit C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit D, 
1
 Utah R. App. P. 24 requires references to the record to include citations thereto. 
Respondent's counsel checked out the district court record to assist in briefing this matter. 
However, the record at this time is not paginated in accordance with Utah R. App. P. 11(b). 
Accordingly, citation to the record by page number is not currently possible. 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.) Respondent timely appealed therefrom. 
(Exhibit E, Notice of Appeal.) 
Statement of Facts 
The facts pertinent to this appeal center around the parties' respective 
retirement benefits. The Court prefaced its findings with regards to the 
retirement accounts that there would be a review of a "T-Mobile account," and 
that if the account was found to exist and have value, there would be a credit 
given. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 20:4-7.) This was reflected in 1J36 of the Decree of 
Divorce: "If the Petitioner has additional retirement with Delta Airlines, T-Mobile, 
the Respondent may be entitled to a credit for his one-half (1/2) interest." 
(Exhibit B, Decree of Divorce, 1f36.)(Emphasis added.) 
From the evidence introduced at trial, the trial court found that Petitioner 
had interests in four retirement accounts worth $29,617.26, plus anything that 
came from Respondent's further investigation. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 20:8-13.) 
The trial court found that Respondent had interests in three retirement accounts, 
including a small defined benefit plan, worth $65,141.00. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 
20:21-25 - 21:1-5.) The Court took the difference between the two, splitting it in 
half, and then awarded the Petitioner $17,762.00. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 21:6-15.) 
The Court specifically found that the retirement accounts should not be divided in 
accordance with Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). (April 23, 
2004 Tr. at 19:20-23.) The Petitioner's award of the net value of the parties' 
retirement was included in a global property division, for which Respondent was 
required to pay Petitioner's share of $106,704.00 by refinancing real properties to 
allow for cash payment. (Decree of Divorce at ffl[37-38.) 
A subsequent Order to Show Cause was scheduled to secure, among 
other things, Petitioner's cooperation in refinancing properties for the settlement, 
and information from Petitioner regarding her Delta Family Care Retirement Plan. 
(Exhibit C, Order to Show Cause.) This Order to Show Cause issued before the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree had been signed. 
At the hearing regarding the Order to Show Cause, Respondent raised the issue 
of the offset for the Delta retirement with the Court. (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 53:18.) 
Respondent's counsel explained to the Court that subpoenas had been sent out 
and that they were having trouble finding the information. (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 
54:3-13.) Petitioner's counsel represented that he believed that the plan in 
question had been rolled over into another retirement plan and that Petitioner did 
not know of any other retirement account.2 (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 54:20-25 - 55:1.) 
The dialogue then proceeded: 
Mr. Bailey (Petitioner's counsel): Now, on the record it says if a retirement 
with T-Mobile, there is an offset. If there's another account, and it isn't the 
same account that was rolled over, we're happy to give credit. 
The Court: As an offset? 
Mr. Bailey: Yeah. If there's another account that's not the same account 
that was rolled over. They want to count it twice. 
2
 Petitioner also denied at trial and in responses to written discovery prior to trial that the 
retirement plan existed. 
Mr. Echard (Respondent's counsel): We've issued a subpoena and 
hopefully we'll know. If we don't, you can't tie this up. I'm issuing the 
subpoena and we hope to know in that time -
The Court: Well, I guess if the time has passed, then you end up getting a 
judgment for the amount of the one-half. 
Mr. Bailey: Well, we can address that. We're not here to hide anything. 
We're here to be straight up, as Mr. Echard is, on this. We would 
represent affirmatively to the Court there is no other retirement. 
Mr. Echard: That's already (inaudible). And we're just following up on the 
subpoena and we're getting a hard time from the company. But we're 
doing the best we can. 
(Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 55:2-24.)(ltalics added.) 
After some effort on the part of Respondent and his counsel, Respondent 
obtained evidence that there was, in fact, another retirement account in March 
2005. It was shown that Petitioner had a 100% vested interest in the Delta 
Family Care Retirement Plan, ("the retirement plan,") which is a defined benefit 
pension plan, through which Petitioner is entitled to monthly payments of 
$727.29, beginning on October. 1, 2019. Respondent retained an actuary who 
determined the present value of Petitioner's interest in the plan to be 
$101,326.00. Respondent filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on July 15, 
2005 to bring this evidence before the Court and obtain a ruling regarding 
Respondent's offset to the property division. (Exhibit F, Respondent's Motion 
and Memorandum.) 
On October 31, 2005, the matter came before the trial court for a hearing 
on objections to the language of proposed findings and for Respondent's request 
for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner's counsel presented some details of the 
plan to the Court, and argued Respondent should not receive an offset for the 
plan, as previously stipulated, but should only be awarded his Woodward share. 
(Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 23:22 - 27:9) Respondent proffered the expert's opinion as 
to the present value of the plan. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 31:8-25 - 32:1-4.) The 
trial court expressed concerns that the newly discovered benefit plan differed 
from the previous retirement accounts, because it was difficult, according to the 
court, to determine the present value of the account. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 34:9 -
36:6.) Respondent argued that he should be allowed to present evidence to the 
Court. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 37:1-13.) The trial court concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing would make no difference and awarded Respondent an 
interest in the plan under the Woodward formula. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 47:6-12.) 
This holding was in direct contradiction to 1J36 of the Decree of Divorce. This 
order was reduced to writing in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, awarding 
Respondent aninterest in. the retirement plan through April 20, 2004, the date of 
the trial, as opposed to the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. (Exhibit D, 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.) Prior to Petitioner's preparation of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, there was no mention of making Petitioner's 
interest in the retirement plan retroactive to the date of trial by the trial court. The 
trial court's in court ruling made no mention of retroactivity. (Oct, 31, 2005 Tr. at 
47.) The Court gave no other notice and made no finding of good cause to 
support the retroactivity of this provision. Nevertheless, the Supplemental 
Divorce Decree made the award retroactive to April 20, 2004. 
Summary of Argument 
The Supplemental Divorce Decree entered by the trial court, which 
awarded Respondent only his Woodward share of the retirement plan should be 
overturned. The trial court abused its discretion in treating the retirement plan 
differently from the other retirement benefits owned by the parties and in refusing 
to give effect to a stipulation between the parties, which the Court had previously 
adopted and concluded to be reasonable. Moreover, the trial court erred in not 
holding that Petitioner was judicially estopped from changing her position. 
Finally, the trial court erred in making Respondent's Woodward interest in the 
retirement plan retroactive to the time of trial. The trial court's orders in these 
regards should be reversed. 
Argument 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Respondent Only a 
Woodward Interest in the Retirement Plan. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Awarding 
Respondent an Off-Set Against the Property Division. 
By awarding Respondent only a Woodward share in Petitioner's retirement 
plan, the trial court abused its discretion. As a general rule, "The interest in a 
retirement plan accrued during marriage is considered a marital asset subject to 
equitable distribution upon divorce." Motes v Motes. 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Likewise, "The best method for distributing or allocating retirement 
benefits or their value depends on the particular circumstances, but where 
possible the purpose to advance is that of 'end[ing] marriage and allowing] the 
parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably 
possible.'" id., citing. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988). 
The court's order should allow the parties to "readjust their lives to their new 
circumstances as well as possible." Gardner, at 1078. In this case, the trial court 
initially did exactly that by requiring a valuation of all assets and globally dividing 
all assets. 
Woodward is the seminal case for determining how to distribute retirement 
benefits. In Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court quoted the following language 
with approval: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too 
susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our 
courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This goal 
may be best accomplished, if a present value of the pension plan is 
ascertainable, by fixing the other spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the length of time the petitioner must 
survive to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of other assets leaving all 
pension benefits to the employee himself. 
Woodward, at 433, citing. Kikkert v. Kikkert. 427 A.2d 76, 78 (N.J. Super. 1981). 
The Woodward court only supported a deferred distribution "where other 
assets for equitable distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be established." Woodward, at 433. This Court has further 
clarified, "Thus, as between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply 
deferring the other spouse's participation until payments are eventually received, 
our Supreme Court has stated that the latter 'alternative should be employed only 
in rare instances.'" Motes, at 234, citing. Gardner, at 1079. In addition, while the 
timing of benefits must depend on the circumstances of the given case, the trial 
court should consider whether there is "particular animosity" between the parties 
as well as whether an immediate distribution "would create a hardship or 
penalty." Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, 
the trial court's findings should be sufficiently detailed to allow the appellate court 
to see the basis for its conclusions. See. Gardner, at 1078. 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce represented the culmination of a seven 
year legal battle involving numerous attorneys and numerous objections to and 
hearings regarding the proposed findings.3 At the termination of trial, the Court 
awarded Petitioner a cash award representing the difference in value of the 
various retirement interests known to the parties at the time of trial. The trial 
court specifically found that a Woodward distribution should not be employed. 
This was added to a global property division, totaling in excess of $100,000.00, 
which Respondent was required to satisfy by refinancing real property awarded 
to him during the settlement. Based on the Petitioner's stipulation, both at trial 
and at a subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing, the retirement plan was to 
be treated as an off-set against the property settlement. 
However, when the evidence came forward that Petitioner's prior 
affirmative representations to the trial court were false, the trial court reversed 
3
 A review of the record reflects that Petitioner has been represented by no less than four 
attorneys and that Respondent has engaged the services of at least three separate attorneys for 
his cause. 
course and allowed Petitioner to escape both her prior stipulation and 
representations to the court. At the October 31, 2005, Petitioner argued that 
there were too many variables (without enumerating any and without the proffer 
of any expert opinion) to determine a present value for the retirement plan. 
However, notwithstanding Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court, without any evidence on the record before it, and in spite of proffered 
evidence from an actuary to the contrary, determined that it could not be 
persuaded that there was an ascertainable present value for the Petitioner's 
newly discovered retirement plan. 
In so doing, the trial court made no written or oral findings about the 
feasibility of determining a value for the plan.4 The trial court made no findings 
regarding the feasibility of Petitioner paying the plan value immediately, nor the 
hardship or penalty imposed upon Respondent, who was required to satisfy his 
property obligations by refinancing property to do so. The trial court likewise 
failed to take into account the policy expectations promoted by this court and the 
Utah Supreme Court, which advocate a property distribution that brings finality. 
To the contrary, had the trial court properly applied the caselaw, it would 
have noted the long, adversarial process the parties had gone through to 
conclude their divorce. The trial court also should have taken into account that 
the Respondent had been required to come up with cash to compensate 
4
 In Gardner, the court noted that "[rjegardless of how remote the full value of an asset is, it still 
has present value." Gardner, at 1078. Gardner requires precise findings before a conclusion by 
a trial court that present value cannot be ascertained. ]d. 
Petitioner for the property distribution. Classifying Petitioner's assets differently 
constituted an unfair penalty. In addition, deferring the compensation was 
patently unfair given the cash Petitioner had from the property settlement, as well 
real property Petitioner retained. Given that Respondent had already paid 
$100,000.00 to Petitioner in conjunction with the trial court's orders, there is no 
question that Petitioner is fully able to compensate Respondent for his interest in 
the retirement plan, without there being a need to defer the distribution until 
Petitioner's retirement. Finally, the trial court's order leaves uncertainty for 
Respondent, who now must wait several years before his rights are resolved, 
where the same is not true for the Petitioner. The trial court's failure to address 
or properly weigh these issues can only be considered an abuse of discretion. 
This Court should accordingly reverse the trial court's findings relevant to the 
retirement plan. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Enforce the 
Stipulation of the Parties. 
The trial court further abused its discretion in this matter by failing to 
enforce the stipulation of the parties, entered into the record at trial, and further 
confirmed at the December 9, 2004 Order to Show Cause hearing. In Batty v. 
Batty, 2006 UT App 506,1J2, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 54, this Court wrote: 
"[P]arties are generally free to agree upon facts subject to judicial 
application of the law." While such an agreement may be perceived as 
paring back the role of the court as fact-finder, ... in most cases this result 
should be welcomed as an exercise entirely consistent with efficient and 
just judicial administration." Thus, while "[t]he court need not necessarily 
abide by the terms of the litigants'] stipulations" regarding property 
distribution, those stipulations "should be respected and given great 
weight." 
Id., citing. In re E.H.. 2006 UT 36, fl22, 137 P.3d 809; Pearson v. Pearson. 561 
P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). See, ajso, Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 
1975)(Stipulation should be adopted if it is fair and reasonable.) In Batty, the 
parties had stipulated to a valuation of business holdings. The trial court 
discounted the valuation and assessed a value, which resulted in a substantial 
inequality. This Court concluded that in so doing, the trial court committed an 
abuse of discretion. 
In this case, at the time of trial, the trial court adopted the stipulation of the 
parties regarding the retirement plan as a reasonable one. The parties further 
affirmed their commitment to this stipulation at the subsequent order to show 
cause hearing where Petitioner's counsel stated to the court, "If there's another 
account, and it isn't the same account that was rolled over, we're happy to give 
credit [as an off-set.]" In the October 31, 2005 hearing the trial court deviated 
from this agreement claiming that it never anticipated a difference in the type of 
retirement account. However, neither the trial court nor the parties ever made 
such a distinction in the stipulation. Furthermore, at least one of Respondent's 
accounts, for which the trial court assigned a present value and added to 
Petitioner's property distribution, was also a defined benefit retirement plan. The 
trial court's abuse of discretion is most highlighted by its initial conclusion that the 
stipulation should be followed. In reversing course, the trial created inequality by 
treating Petitioner's assets differently. Respondent was subject to undue 
hardship as he was required to refinance properties to compensate Petitioner for 
benefits which were classified differently from the Petitioner's assets. 
Accordingly, the trial court's treatment of the retirement plan should be reversed. 
II. Petitioner Should Be Judicially Estopped From Demanding a 
Woodward Division of the Retirement Plan. 
Not only did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the 
stipulation of the parties in its Supplemental Divorce Decree, but it erred in 
allowing Petitioner to take an inconsistent position from that taken at trial and in 
the December 9, 2004 hearing. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a person 
or their privies may not deny a position taken in a prior judicial proceeding, to the 
prejudice of another, it such prior position was successfully maintained. See. 
e.g.. 3D Constr. and Dev.. L L C , v. Old Standard Life Insurance Co.. 2005 UT 
App 307, fl11,117 P.3d 1082. In Utah, the doctrine of judicial estoppel has five 
elements of proof: 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v.Qpenshaw Investment Co.. 102 Utah 509, 
132 P.2d 388 (1942), the supreme court identified four elements a party 
seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine must show: (1) the prior 
and subsequent judicial proceedings involved the same parties or their 
privies; (2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve the same 
subject matter; (3) the party opposing judicial estoppel seeks to deny a 
position he or she took in the prior judicial proceeding; and (4) the party 
seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent judicial proceedings must have 
"relied on the former testimony." More recently, this court identified a fifth 
requirement for a party seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine -
the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought must have exhibited bad 
faith. 
Orvis v. Johnson. 2006 UT App 394, HIP4-15, 146 P.3d 886. In 3D Construction. 
the Court noted that bad faith was not demonstrated by mistakenly checking a 
box on a bankruptcy form, but was evidenced in false affirmative representations. 
3D Construction, at fl12. 
In the case at bar, the elements of judicial estoppel are met. Each of the 
judicial hearings involved was centered in the parties' divorce, to which both 
Petitioner and Respondent are parties. At trial, and at the December 9, 2004 
order to show cause, Petitioner affirmatively stipulated that if another retirement 
account existed it should be the basis for an off-set to the property division in 
favor of Respondent. This was noted in the Divorce Decree and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law themselves. Moreover, Petitioner benefited from the 
stipulation in that the Court awarded her a present value cash distribution for 
retirement benefits, as opposed to a Woodward share. Respondent relied on 
these representations in conducting further discovery to identify undisclosed 
benefits and in refinancing his properties to comply with the court order 
predicated in part on the stipulation. Finally, Petitioner exhibited in bad faithJn 
affirmatively representing to the first that any benefit had been rolled over into 
some other plan, and second by affirmatively representing to the Court that the 
retirement plan did not exist. 
Under these circumstances, the Petitioner should be estopped from 
denying the effect of the parties' stipulation on the later discovered retirement 
plan. In allowing Petitioner to reverse arguments and advocate that Respondent 
only receive his Woodward share, the trial court erred. The decision of the trial 
court awarding Respondent only a Woodward share of the retirement plan should 
be reversed. 
III. The Trial Court Erred In Making Its Decree Retroactive to the Time of 
Trial Nunc Pro Tunc. 
Utah law states, "A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good 
cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro 
Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of 
marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-1. The appellate courts have broadly 
interpreted this statute to allow retroactivity of divorce orders upon a showing of 
good cause. See, e ^ , Home v. Home. 737 P.2d 244, 248-49 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Likewise, the meaning of good cause "must be determined on a case by 
case basis, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as equity and justice 
require." id. Notwithstanding, the liberal application of this statute, the trial court 
erred in making Respondent's Woodward share in the retirement plan retroactive 
to the time of trial. 
The district court's order in this regard is error because of lack of notice 
and absence of good cause. The issue of ordering that the Woodward share 
apply retroactively was never raised by Petitioner when discovery proved that the 
retirement plan existed. A possible nunc pro tunc order was likewise never 
raised when the trial court heard oral arguments on the matter on October 31, 
2005. To the contrary, Petitioner's counsel simply slipped the retroactivity 
language into the final version of the Supplemental Divorce Decree. 
The Supplemental Divorce Decree is further wanting because there is no 
finding of good cause. As the matter was never raised with the trial court, the 
trial court made no findings in this regard as required by the statute. In this case, 
even assuming arguendo that the retirement plan should only be divided under 
Woodward, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is not 
good cause for valuing the interest retroactively to the time of trial. Prior to trial, 
at trial, and at subsequent hearings, Petitioner affirmatively represented to the 
Court that the retirement plan did not exist. A review of the record reflects that 
Respondent had to undertake extensive efforts to prove the existence of the 
retirement plan. Only in March 2005, almost a year after the trial, did Delta 
Airlines officials provide answers to Respondent's subpoenas. Given the effort 
required of Respondent and his counsel to prove the existence of the 
undisclosed retirement plan, the equities of the matter demand that the 
retirement plan be valued as of the date of the Supplemental Divorce Decree. 
The determination of the trial court should be reversed in this regard. 
Conclusion 
As set forth herein, the district court's treatment of the retirement plan 
reflected an abuse of discretion. The district court did not treat the retirement 
assets of the parties equally, and provided an insufficient basis for awarding 
Respondent only a Woodward share in the retirement plan. The district court 
further abused its discretion in failing to adopt the express stipulation of the 
parties. Moreover, the district court erred in allowing Petitioner to take an 
inconsistent position as to the treatment of the retirement plan, which was at 
variance with the parties' stipulation. Finally, the district court's retroactive 
valuation of Respondent's Woodward share constitutes further error as the order 
did not comply with the statute. For these reasons, Respondent respectfully 
requests that the district court's findings relative to the retirement plan be 
reversed, and that the matter be remanded for a determination as to the present 
value of Respondent's interest in the retirement plan, to be off-set against the 
property division. 
DATED this +*> day of March, 2007. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Bv: %%JVW> 
Brad C. Sr f f l t f f -^ 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 2007,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, to the 
following individuals: 
Jon J. Bunderson 
45 North 100 East 
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10-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of debts -
mrt to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — 
imeritorious petition for modification. 
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
>erty, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
i) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
lependent children; 
:>) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
opriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
:) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
es contracted or incurred during marriage; 
i) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, 
jations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
ii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
I) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
I) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent 
ren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care 
le dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
heir support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts 
reasonable and necessary. 
) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children bom to the mother and father after entry 
j decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the 
idiate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer 
force a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
mrt determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent 
Ler member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
t-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, 
ling actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
ie or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
I (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
) the length of the marriage; 
i whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
i) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
tion received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
stermining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
suitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. 
i marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
insider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
>ouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
rtermining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of 
Dth spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property anc 
yarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or 
3rn during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the 
Larriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based 
1 a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did 
Dt exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as 
rovided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct 
istifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
larriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that 
istify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
)rmer spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the 
^marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is 
lade a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the part} 
aying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
onended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session 
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J0-4a-l. Authority of court. 
\ court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter 
>rder nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
cted by Chapter 118,1983 General Session 
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STEVEN R. BAILEY #0174 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2454 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-4430 
Facsimile: (801) 621-4436 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 





PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 994701457 




The Court having received into evidence the Affidavit of Grounds; and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now makes and enters the 
following Order: 
DECREEJQFJUYQRCE 
1. The Petitioner and the Respondent are each granted a divorce one from the 
other based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. The parties are each awarded joint legal and physical custody of the parties' 
minor child with Respondent having the primary physical residence, to wit: 
Skyelee Brooke Lamano, born June 26, 1995. Vhe Court orders that the pnmaiy 
residence of Skyelee at the present time will be designated as the Respondent's. 
This may be reviewed in the future. 
Skyelee Lamano shall continue her counseling sessions with Angela Jackson to 
assist her in dealing with her parents and helping her express herself as it 
pertains to non-essential activities that she wishes to participate in. Dr. Matthew 
Davies is directed to send Angela Jackson a letter outlining his thoughts 
regarding her involvement as a neutral facilitator in assisting Skyelee. This Court 
finds that it is appropriate to incorporate both of Dr. Davies' letters in the final 
order of the Court. The letters were received into evidence; and are attached to 
the Findings as Exhibits "A" and "B". 
Michael Glasmann shall continue as Master to make decisions regarding 
visitation issues, Skyelee's activities, and assist the parties in resolving other 
issues that may arise. Michael Glasmann shall have decision making capability 
to address post-divorce issues based on the agreement of the parties. Either 
party may object to his recommendations, but in the event in the opinion of the 
Court that said objection is frivolous, the other party will be entitled to their 
attorney's fees and other sanctions that may be imposed. 
Michael Glasmann shall be given authority to make decisions in the event the 
parties cannot agree, which would include, but not be limited to, issues involving 
visitation schedules; to listen to Skyelee as to what activities she wishes to 
participate in; to address conflicts between the parties as it pertains to Skyelee 
regarding parenting issues, or any other issues that the parties cannot resolve 
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including education, school, etc., and to enforce violations of agreements 
entered into by the parties that are not followed. 
6. Michael Glasmann shall have decision-making capabilities in this regard and 
made recommendations, subject to this Court's review, in the event either party 
asks for a review. In the event a hearing is requested to review Michael 
Glasmann's recommendation and in the opinion of the Court said objection is 
frivolous, then the party requesting a hearing will be subject to having attorney's 
fees being awarded in favor of the other party for having to respond. 
7. The Court orders that, based upon the recommendations made in Court of 
Dr. Matthew Davies, in the event that either party interferes with the other 
parties' involvement with Skyelee or fails to comply with the agreement of this 
Court or the recommendations of Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be 
subject to a finding of contempt and or a jail sentence as well as other 
appropriate penalties. 
8. The Court requests the Respondent to meet with Skyelee's therapist, Angela 
Jackson, to determine if there are any problems with Skyelee continuing in 
therapy with Angela Jackson. In the event the Respondent has concerns, he 
may bring his concerns before this Court only to determine whether or not his 
concerns are justified requiring that Skyelee participate with another counselor. 
In the event a new counselor is necessary, the Court will rely on the 
recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies, though the Court does find, based 
upon the conversation with Skyelee, in chambers, that Skyelee has a good 
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working relationship with Angela Jackson. 
9. Based upon a stipulation of the parties read in open Court and based upon joint 
physical custody, the Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of 
$110 per month as and for child support based upon the parties's income as 
outlined in Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact. Child support will commence 
May 1,2004. 
10. Both parties currently maintain the minor children on their health insurance. 
Each party will continue to maintain the children and each party will pay one-half 
(!4) of any non-covered medical, dental, or orthodontic expenses for the minor 
children. 
11. The Court orders and the parties have agreed to follow the standard parent-time 
schedule for the purposes of determining holiday visitation. That the 
Respondent will follow the Odd year schedule and the Petitioner will follow the 
Even year schedule. That Halloween and Valentine Days will alternate by the 
parents. In the event of conflict with vacation plans, Respondent's plans will 
prevail in the even years, and the Petitioner's plans will prevail in the odd years. 
The Respondent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years, and the even 
year holidays in the odd years. 
12. Neither Angela Jackson nor Michael Glasmann may be removed from their 
professional capacity without an order of this Court. Both parties are ordered to 
pay one-half (%) of the costs associated with such therapy or costs associated 
with the Master if not covered by insurance after the date of trial. 
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13. Both parties shall have equal access to Angela Jackson and shall work with her 
for the benefit of Skyelee. 
14. In the event that either party interferes with the other parties' involvement with 
Skyelee or fails to comply with the order of the Court or the recommendations of 
Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be subject to a jail sentence and/or a 
finding of contempt by this Court and appropriate penalties will be imposed. 
15. In the event that Skyelee wishes to participate in other recreational, religious or 
social activities, her opinion shall be given great weight by both Angela Jackson 
and Michael Glasmann in determining what activities she will participate in. 
16. The exchange of Skyelee for visitation will be curbside at the other parties' 
residence. The party dropping off Skyelee may remain until the party is assured 
that Skyelee is safe and with a family member or someone she is familiar with. 
17. In the event that either party is going to be less than four hours from the agreed 
upon drop off time because of work commitments, then Skyelee may stay with 
her grandmother, a family member or someone she is familiar with. In the event 
either party is going to be more that four hours late picking up the child or being 
available for drop-off, then the parent having Skyelee may keep her until the 
other parent becomes available. In the event either parent will not arrive before 
10:00 p.m., Skyelee will remain with that parent she is presently with, and the 
other parent may pick Skyelee up after 8:00 a.m. the following day. 
18. The Court orders that if there is going to be an extended absence of four of more 
hours by either party, then either party will be given preference for providing the 
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necessary daycare for watching Skyelee as is provided by statute. 
19= Skyelee's Delta flight card will be assigned to her along with her passport, and 
will follow her with whatever parent she is with at the time. This, however, does 
not mean that for every visitation exchange the Delta flight card and passport 
need not be transferred. Skyelee has access to a Delta flight card that is 
assigned to her. The card will be kept with and will follow Skyelee, and may be 
used if the Respondent travels with Skyelee so long as he does not violate any 
of the rules and regulations of Delta Air Lines in utilizing the Delta flight card in 
the event the Respondent and Skyelee fly together. 
20. The Respondent is awarded no interest in the Petitioner's "Buddy Passes" or 
"Companion Passes" provided by Delta Air Lines and the passes will not be 
considered marital property. 
21. Petitioner withdraws her claim to alimony and alimony is not awarded to 
Petitioner and Petitioner waives any future claim to alimony and as part of this 
settlement. Petitioner may keep the two burial plots currently owned, and 
Respondent waives any future claim to the buddy passes Petitioner receives 
from her employment at Delta Air Lines. Respondent made no request for 
alimony. 
22. In the event that the Respondent is traveling with Skyelee using Skyelee's Delta 
flight pass, he will act appropriately in all circumstances in order not to jeopardize 
the Petitioner's employment with Delta Air Lines. The Respondent will not be 
able to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to a higher priority pass. 
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23. If either party is traveling domestically for more than three (3) days, they will give 
each other at least seven (7) days advance notice and, in the event that party 
and child travels out of state, they will provide an itinerary, projected schedules, 
hotel and contact telephone numbers. In the event of a change, the party having 
Skyelee with them will advise the other parent, as soon as possible, upon any 
changes being made. In the event the parties are traveling internationally, each 
party will cooperate with the other to ensure that Skyelee has her passport and 
will notify the other thirty (30) days in advance of perspective flights with the 
understanding that if a flight changes because of a problem, then each party will 
give the other as much possible notice regarding said changes. 
24. The parties have agreed to a division of personal property with the exception of 
certain items, and each party has the property they request in their possession 
they wish. In open Court, the parties agreed that the couch and love seat will be 
returned to the Respondent who has the responsibility for picking those items up. 
The Petitioner is entitled to her dresser in the Respondent's home and her 
personal property in the Respondent's storage shed. 
25. The parties will exchange and provide any photos or videos of family activities for 
the purposes of copying by February 1, 2005, then each party will split the cost 
associated with the copying effort. 
26. The parties, during the course of the marriage, have acquired various parcels of 
property, which are identified as follows: 
A) 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah 84041 
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B) 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
C) 997 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
D) 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
E) 1033 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
F) 1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
G) 1225 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
H) Lot 208, Peacefield Subdivision, Layton, Utah 
27. The Court orders that, based upon the November 2, 1999 hearing, the 
Respondent will be awarded the two West properties located at 997 East Gentile 
Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah. The Petitioner will be 
awarded the East properties located at 1033 East Gentile Street and 1041 East 
Gentile Street, Layton, Utah. 
28. The Respondent is awarded the residence that he is presently living in located at 
111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah and that the Petitioner is awarded the 
residence that she is presently living in located at 1013 East Gentile Street, 
Layton, Utah free and clear of any claim by the other party. 
29. The 1225 East Gentile property was acquired by the parties in 1994 in which a 
second mortgage with Washington Mutual was taken out in the family residence 
located at 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah, and a second mortgage with 
Community First on one of the west four-plexes located at 997 East Gentile 
Street, Layton, Utah which is awarded to the Respondent. 
30. The Respondent will be awarded the two four-plexes located at 997 East Gentile 
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Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, free and clear of any claim by 
the Petitioner. The legal description to be used will be the legal description 
recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office, subject to any easements of 
record. 
31. The Respondent will be awarded Lot 208 Peacefield and 1225 East Gentile (raw 
land) as his sole property free of any claim of Petitioner. 
32. The Petitioner will be awarded the two four-plexes located at 1033 East Gentile 
Street and 1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, free and clear of any claim by 
Respondent. The legal description to be used will be the legal description 
recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office, subject to any easements of 
record. 
33. The parties will continue to share the garbage dumpster, parking and common 
areas and access as they have historically done and neither party shall interfere 
with the historical use or enjoyment of those areas subject to any legal action 
filed by either party addressing the real property issues. 
34. Each party is given the right of first refusal in the event the other party wishes to 
sell their four-plexes by giving written notice of the terms of the sale to the other 
party, and the other party, upon receiving written notice, shall have fifteen (15) 
days to match it. 
35. In reviewing the various properties and equities of the parties, the retirements, 
and having calculated the various offsets, there is a difference in which the 
Petitioner will be reimbursed by the Respondent the amount of $106,704 from 
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the Respondent for a total of $106,704 that the Respondent owes the Petitioner. 
36. The Court orders that, based upon the agreement of the parties, if the Petitioner 
has additional retirement with Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be 
entitled to a credit for his one-half (Yz) interest. The Respondent represented 
that he sent a subpoena requesting the records. The Court has addressed this 
item in the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
37. Based upon the decision of the Court, the Petitioner is awarded an interest to 
offset the value of real estate and retirement that was awarded to the 
Respondent in the sum of $106,704. 
38. The parties are ordered to refinance their properties to remove each other's 
names from any mortgage obligation and are directed to execute quit claim 
deeds as may be necessary to effectuate the Court's order. In the event that the 
Respondent is unable to refinance the property, then the Respondent will pay to 
the Petitioner the sum as follows: $25,000 plus interest at the rate of five percent 
(5%) on the 120th day after this hearing with 25,000 plus interest due each and 
every year thereafter for a period of two (2) years, and on the third year, the 
remaining balance in the sum of $56,704 plus interest. 
39. The Respondent will be awarded the 1991 Jeep Wrangler and the 1987 Ford 
Truck subject to the indebtedness thereon and the two 1974 Yamaha 
motorcycles, his personal motorcycle, and the motorcycle trailer. The Petitioner 
will be awarded the 1991 Toyota Camry subject to the indebtedness thereon, if 
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any. Each party will execute any documents necessary to effectuate this 
transfer. 
40. The Petitioner has accrued the following retirements with definitive cash 
amounts: 
Delta Family Care Savings Plan $18,166.98 
American General Financial $3,052.16 
Delta Sky Shares $2,340.80 
American Scandia $5,607.32 
TOTAL: $29,617.26 
41. The Respondent has accrued the following retirements and definitive cash 
amounts: 
Thrift Savings Plan $43,220.00 
Traditional IRA $16,390.00 
Federal Employees $5,531.00 
TOTAL: $64,141.00 
42. There is a difference of $35,524, which the Petitioner will be awarded a one-half 
(1/2) interest in ($17,762). 
43. The Court enters a Restraining Order restraining either party from denigrating 
the other or allowing a third party to denigrate the other party in front of the 
parties' minor child, Skyelee, or harassing the other party. 
44. The primary religion of the minor child shall be Lutheran, but the Petitioner may 
take the minor child to LDS activities and services when it is her parenting time. 
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45. On the Respondent's holidays, especially Christmas, he may take the minor child 
to Lutheran midnight mass services, but the Petitioner is not obligated on her 
Christmas Eve or other holidays to take the child to Lutheran services or allow 
the Respondent to take the child to Lutheran services if it is not his parenting 
time. Whichever parent Skyelee is with that day may take her to whatever 
religious service they wish. 
46. On the Petitioner's holidays or parenting time, the Respondent will not be 
allowed to take the child to religious or other activities. On the Respondent's 
holidays or parenting time, the Petitioner will not be allowed to take the child to 
religious or other activities. 
47. In the event of Bible School, the parties are directed to adjust their schedules to 
accommodate Skyelee's participation in the event that Skyelee wishes to attend. 
For significant religious functions or ceremonies, the parties shall work through 
the Special Master and Angela Jackson. 
48. If there are conflicts between religious activities, then the Lutheran religious 
activities will be given preference. The Court orders that a church hay ride, 
picnics, or other activities, which the Court considers social activities, shall not 
take priority over the visitation time of the Petitioner. 
49. The Petitioner will not be required to transport the child to gymnastic practices 
during her parenting time. Petitioner shall pay and has paid the $1,000.00 owed 
to North Davis Gymnastics. 
50. Each party will be awarded every other year the tax exemption for Skyelee, with 
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the Respondent claiming her in 2004 for so long as he is current on his child 
support obligation by December 31 of each year. The Petitioner shall be entitled 
to Skyelee for tax purposes in the year 2005 and every odd-numbered year 
thereafter. 
51. As a matter of the Petitioner's employment, Skyelee receives six (6) "S2" priority 
vacation passes each year and that the passes are forfeited if not used by the 
Petitioner's employment anniversary date. The Respondent is not to utilize 
these passes during the periods of time that he is traveling with Skyelee, and will 
not be allowed to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to an "S2" vacation pass. 
However, the Petitioner is encouraged to make the "S2" passes available to the 
Respondent is she does not intend to use them. 
52. The Court orders that in addition to normal entry documentation for international 
travel, the child is under 18 years old and must have a written notarized 
statement from the other parent to travel internationally. The Court orders both 
parties to cooperate in providing a written notarized statement to allow Skyelee 
to travel. 
53. The Petitioner will not disrupt Skyelee's flight schedule while she is flying with the 
Respondent, and will not make negative comments on Delta's Flight System 
regarding the minor child or the Respondent. 
54. Each party will pay their own attorney's fees and costs associated therewith. 
55. In the event there is any violation of the Decree, or if either party files an Order to 
Show Cause or Petition to Modify, that legal action will be brought before this 
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Court. 
56. The Findings of Fact adopted by the Court shall further delineate the intent of 
this Court and shall be incorporated as part of the order of this Court. 
57. The Petitioner shall be allowed to resume her maiden name of "Salerno" if she 
so desires. 
Let judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this _ J ^ d a y of A o g _, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
* 
Glen R. Dawsoj f^ i £ v -
District Court j | d g 4 W& * 
rad C. Smith 
Attorney for Brian Lamano 
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Mailing Certificate 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of , 2006,1 mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce via U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, to the following individual(s): 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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STEVEN R. BAILEY #0174 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2454 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)621-4436 
Facsimile: (801) 621-4436 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT - STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 994701467 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
A Trial in the above-entitled matter came regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson, sitting as Judge in the above-entitled case on the 20th day 
of April 2004 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. until completed. Present in Court was the 
Petitioner, Pamela A. Lamano, and her attorney of record, Steven R Barley; and the 
Respondent, Brian C. Lamano, and his attorney of record, Robert A. Echard. The 
Court having received and admitted into evidence the exhibits offered by counsel; and 
the Court having made its decision on the record, now makes and enters the following 
Findings: F/nd,nqsoff_ J 
FINDINGS 
The Respondent and the Petitioner are husband and wife having been married 
on September 25, 1980 in Ogden, Utah. 
Both the Petitioner and Respondent are residents of Davis County, State of Utah 
and have been for more than three months prior to the filing of the Complaint for 
Divorce. 
The Court finds that jurisdiction is vested in this Court by virtue of Utah Code 
Annotated §78-27-24(6)(1953, as amended). 
During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen making 
the continuation of the marriage impossible. Both parties should be entitled to a 
divorce one from the other on said grounds. 
Three children have been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Joshua Ryan 
Lamano, born December 30, 1982; Zachary Brian Lamano, born April 8, 1984; 
and Skyelee Brooke Lamano, born June 26, 1995. 
Both Joshua Ryan Lamano and Zachary Brian Lamano, at the time of the trial, 
were emancipated; Skyelee Brooke Lamano is a minor child. 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and order signed by this Court, Dr. 
Matthew Davies was retained by the parties to determine custody for the 
purposes of assessing the parties' claim to be awarded the full, complete care 
and custody of the parties minor child to wit: Skyelee Brooke Lamano. 
Both parties appeared on several occasions and met with Dr. Davies for the 
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purposes of completing various tests, and supplied collateral references and 
other documents as requested by Dr. Davies in support of their claim 
9. Dr. Davies prepared and presented letters dealing with the issue of custody 
dated December 5, 2002 and December 8, 2003, respectively. This Court finds 
that it is appropriate to incorporate both letters setting forth its recommendation 
in the final order of the Court. The letters were received into evidence; and for 
the purposes of the Findings are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B". 
10. Based upon the stipulation entered into in open Court, the parties entered into a 
temporary joint legal custody arrangement of Skyelee with both parties sharing 
joint physical custody since the date of the parties' separation up through the 
time of the divorce which was set forth in the order of the Court date*;! November 
2, 1999. 
11. Based upon the recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies at trial, the joint 
custody of Skyelee Brooke Lamano should continue in its present form. The 
Court finds, based upon Dr. Davies' conclusions, that to award one party or the 
other party sole custody of the child may allow the custodial parent to use that 
capacity against the non-custodial parent by interfering with the access or 
visitation which the Court finds would not be in the best interest of the child. The 
parties also stipulated in open Court that the joint physical custody arrangement 
would continue. 
12. The Court finds that, for the purposes of setting forth the child support, the 
parties have entered into an agreement in which the Respondent shall pay to the 
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Petitioner, based upon a joint custody worksheet, the sum of $110 per month, 
which is predicated upon the Petitioner's full time employment with Delta Airlines, 
with an income imputed at $1,800 per month, and the Respondent who is 
employed with N.C.U.A. at the sum of $4,235 per month commencing April 1, 
2004. (A copy of the Child Support Obligation Worksheet is marked Exhibit "C" 
attached hereto and be reference is incorporated into the proposed Findings and 
Conclusions of Law). 
13. The Court finds that the recommendations of Dr. Davies are to be incorporated 
into the parental relationship of the parties, and that the joint physical custody 
continues as was stipulated by the parties in open Court. 
14. The Court finds that the parties have been using Michael Glasmann as a Master 
to assist the parties in assisting them in resolving issues that arise involving 
visitation, non-essential activities, and other issues involving Skyeiee. 
15. The Court finds that the Petitioner contacted Angela Jackson to act as a 
counselor for Skyeiee without initially notifying the Respondent though the Court, 
in chambers, met with Skyeiee and finds that Skyeiee has established a good 
working relationship with Angela Jackson. 
16. The Court finds and requests that Dr. Matthew Davies write a letter to Angela 
Jackson explaining her role as a neutral party ensuring that both the Petitioner 
and the Respondent have necessary access to Angela Jackson and to assist her 
in working for the betterment of Skyeiee in dealing with issues such as non-
essential activities, visitation, parenting time, and other issues that may involve 
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the Parenting recommendation as set forth by Dr. Matthew Davies. 
17. The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should continue to serve as Master is 
assisting the parties and working with both parties in overcoming issues involving 
non-essential activities, visitation, etc., as is relates to Skyelee and request that 
Michael Glasmann work with Angela Jackson to assist Skyelee in expressing her 
wishes and/or desires. Skyelee's requests are to be taken into consideration for 
the best interest of Skyelee. 
18. The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should be given authority to make 
decisions in the event the parties cannot agree, which would include, but not be 
limited to, issues involving visitation schedules; to listen to Skyelee as to what 
activities she wishes to participate in; to address conflicts between the parties as 
it pertains to Skyelee regarding parenting issues, or any other issues that the 
parties cannot resolve including education, school, etc., and to enforce violations 
of agreements entered into by the parties that are not followed. 
19. The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should have decision-making capabilities 
in this regard and made recommendations, subject to this Court's review, in the 
event either party asks for a review. 
20. The Court finds that, in the event a hearing is requested to review Michael 
Glasmann's recommendation and in the opinion of the Court said objection is 
frivolous, then the party requesting a hearing will be subject to having attorney's 
fees being awarded in favor of the other party for having to respond. 
21. The Court finds that, based upon the recommendations made in Court of Dr. 
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Matthew Davies, in the event that either party interferes with the other parties' 
involvement with Skyelee or fails to comply with the agreement of this Court or 
the recommendations of Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be subject to 
a finding of contempt and or a jail sentence as well as other appropriate 
penalties. 
22. The Court requests the Respondent to meet with Skyelee's therapist, Angela 
Jackson, to determine if there are any problems with Skyelee continuing in 
therapy with Angela Jackson. In the event the Respondent has concerns, he 
may bring his concerns before this Court only to determine whether or not his 
concerns are justified requiring that Skyelee participate with another counselor. 
In the event a new counselor is necessary, the Court will rely on the 
recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies, though the Court does find, based 
upon the conversation with Skyelee, in chambers, that Skyelee has a good 
working relationship with Angela Jackson. 
23. The Court finds that neither party may remove Michael Glasmann, as Master, or 
Skyelee's therapist, Angela Jackson, without an order of this Court. Both parties 
will be ordered to pay one-half (V2) of the costs associated with such therapy or 
costs associated with the Master if not covered by insurance after the date of 
trial. 
24. The Court finds that, after conferring with Skyelee, in chambers, that she wishes 
to participate in other recreational activities other than strictly gymnastics, and 
has expressed to the Court her feelings that she would like to stop gymnastics at 
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this time. The parties shall honor Skyelee's desires as to activities and neither 
party is required to participate or may force Skyelee to participate. 
25. The Court finds that both parties should work together for the benefit of Skyelee 
and communicate with each other regarding activities that Skyelee participates 
in. Recreational activities such as sports, dancing, tumbling, etc. will be 
determined in large by the input of Skyelee either through her counselor and/or 
Michael Glasmann. Great weight should be paid to Skyelee's desires as it 
pertains to those type of activities. 
26. The Court finds that during the exchange of Skyelee, either party may drop 
Skyelee off at curbside at the other parties' residence. Skyelee will acknowledge 
that she is safe and with a family member or someone she is familiar with. In the 
event that either party will not be home to receive Skyelee due to their work 
schedule and their absence, and that their absence will extend for more than 
four hours from the time either parent is to drop Skyelee to the other parent, that 
parent shall call the other parent who may keep Skyelee until the other parent 
returns home. In the event that either parent will not arrive before 10:00 p.m., 
Skyelee will remain with that parent she is presently with, and the other parent 
may pick Skyelee up after 8:00 a.m. the following day. 
27. The Court finds that in the event either parent is going to be less than four hours 
from the agreed drop off time, then Skyelee will stay with her grandmother, a 
family member, or someone she is familiar with. 
28. The Court finds that if there is going to be an extended absence of four of more 
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hours by either party, then either party will be given preference for providing the 
necessary daycare for watching Skyelee as is provided by statute. 
29. The Court finds that the benefits of the Petitioner's employment are travel 
benefits. The Delta flight card and travel passes, will remain with the Petitioner. 
Skyelee has access to a Delta flight card that is assigned to her. The card shall 
be kept with and will follow Skyelee, and may be used if the Respondent travels 
with Skyelee so long as he does not violate any of the rules and regulations of 
Delta Air Lines in utilizing the card in the event the Respondent and Skyelee fly 
together. 
30. The Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to what is known as eight (8) "Buddy 
Passes" by virtue of her employment with Delta Air Lines, and a "Companion 
Pass" that the person can assign on a yearly basis to a person of her choosing. 
31. The Court finds that those flight passes are a benefit of Petitioner's employment 
and shall not be considered marital property for the purposes of property 
division. 
32. The Court finds that, based upon the testimony of Cory Lindquist, the Petitioner 
is responsible for the actions of any person utilizing a pass card or travel benefit 
conferred by Delta Air Lines on the Petitioner. 
33. The Court finds that Skyelee has a passport to travel internationally, and that the 
passport will follow her. Each party will notify the other party in the event that 
they intend to fly internationally thirty (30) days in advance of the projected flight 
date, understanding that if flights and travel arrangements change because of a 
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problem, each party will give the other party as much notice as possible to 
change, i.e. itineraries, hotels, flights, etc. 
34. The Court finds that on domestic flights, the parties will give each other seven (7) 
days advance notice if Skyelee is going to be out of state for more than three (3) 
nights along with an itinerary of both domestic and foreign travel, of all hotel 
locations, projected schedules, contact telephone numbers, and shall notify the 
other party immediately if there are any variations of hotels, phone numbers, or 
changes to their itineraries. 
35. The Court finds that the parties have acquired personal property during the 
course of the marriage which was split by agreement of the parties in November 
1999. The Court finds that, based upon the parties5 agreement (outside of the 
couch and love seat which is awarded to the Respondent who will be responsible 
for picking those items up) that each party has stipulated that each party may 
keep the personal property, checking and savings account and motor vehicles in 
their possession, free and clear of any claims by the other party. The Petitioner 
shall be entitled to her dresser in the Respondent's home and her personal 
property in the Respondent's storage shed. The Court finds that the parties 
agreed to this in open Court. 
36. The Court funds that the parties shall take all photos and videos of family 
activities to Inkley's for copying by February 1, 2005, and the parties will split the 
costs associated with the copying of the pictures and home videos. 
37. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be entitled to all of her property in the 
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parties' storage shed, as agreed, including skis and other personal property. 
38. The Court finds that the property owned by Skyelee that was purchased by a 
particular party with separate funds will remain with that party. However, the 
parties will exchange clothes and coats as those items are for the benefit of 
Skyelee and may be utilized by her. 
39. The parties, during the course of the marriage, have acquired various parcels of 
property, which are identified as follows: 
A) 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah 84041 
B) 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
C) 997 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
D) 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
E) 1033 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
F) 1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
G) 1225 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041 
H) Lot 208, Peacefield Subdivision, Layton, Utah 
40. The Court further finds that the property known as 208 Peacefield Subdivision 
was acquired by the Respondent after the separation of the parties and the entry 
of an Order on Order to Show Cause held on or about November 2, 1999. 
41. The Court finds that, based upon the November 2, 1999 hearing, the 
Respondent was awarded the two West properties located at 997 East Gentile 
Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah. The Petitioner was awarded 
the East properties located at 1033 East Gentile Street and 1041 East Gentile 
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Street, Layton, Utah. Another four-plex in the middle is owned by the 
Respondent's sister, Debra Lamano. 
42. The Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over Debra Lamano as she is not a 
party to this divorce proceeding. Any order entered in this case is not binding 
upon Debra Lamano. 
43. The Court finds that the parties have historically shared the garbage dumpster, 
parking and common areas. The Court finds that neither party shall interfere 
with the historical usage or enjoyment of those areas. The historical usage of 
the garbage dumpster, parking and common areas will be maintained by both 
parties unless changed in any other legal action initiated by either party. 
44. The Court finds that both parties should have the option or the right of first 
refusal in their event the Petitioner or the Respondent makes a decision to sell 
their respective four-plex properties. In the event that either party receives a 
written or verbal offer, the offer shall be reduced to writing and will be submitted 
to the other party. The other party shall have fifteen (15) days to match the offer 
after the terms of the sale are provided. The Court understands that the five 
four-plexes located on the property along with the Petitioner's home were divided 
by separate legal descriptions. 
45. The Court finds that the Respondent should be awarded the residence that he is 
presently living in located at|11 East 900 South, Layton, Utah and that the 
Petitioner should be awarded the residence that she is presently living in located 
at 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah free and clear of any claim by the other 
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party, except as otherwise set forth herein. 
46. The Court finds that the 1225 East Gentile property was acquired by the parties 
in 1994 in which a second mortgage with Washington Mutual was taken out in 
the family residence located at 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah, and a second 
mortgage with Community First on one of the west four-plexes located at 997 
East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah which is awarded to the Respondent. 
47. The Court finds that at the times of the parties' separation that the 1225 East 
Gentile property was free and clear and was not encumbered with any liens or 
mortgages. 
48. The Court finds that the Respondent, within 30 days of the parties' separation, 
borrowed $78,000 from the First National Bank of Layton on the property, which 
he used for both personal benefit and for the benefit of the children in their 
wrestling activities as he testified to in Court. 
49. The Court finds that he utilized $15,000 of the proceeds to assist him in 
purchasing the 208 Peacefield lot and lost $7,000 by leaving the money in the 
car at the airport. 
50. The Court finds that the remaining monies may have been used for the benefit of 
the parties' minor children by the Respondent, which this Court, based upon its 
equitable powers, believes should be taken into consideration in determining 
property awards. 
51. The Court finds that the 208 Peacefield lot was purchased after the parties' 
separation, but does specifically find that $15,000 of that money was borrowed 
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from a joint marital asset and that the Petitioner should have an interest of one-
half (V2) of that contribution plus interest and a percentage of the profits. 
52. The Court finds that the parties have stipulated to the value of the Peacefield 
property and finds it to be valued at $136,000. 
53. The Court finds that the parties, in open Court, have stipulated to the value of the 
1225 East Gentile property, known as the "raw land" with a value of $238,500. 
54. The Court finds that the parties have stipulated to the admission of the two 
appraisals obtained, one by the Petitioner, and one by the Respondent, and 
have agreed to add the two appraisals together and divide them in two coming 
up with a value of the properties. 
55. The Court finds that the Respondent refinanced the 1225 East Gentile property 
with Centennial Bank and a mortgage exists on the property of approximately 
$85,135 at the date of trial. 
56. The Court finds that the parties have valued the properties as follows: 
I Parties' Real Estate | 
Address 
J 997 E. Gentile 
J1011 E. Gentile 
[ 1033 E. Gentile 
[1041 E. Gentile 
1111 E. 900 S. 
J1013 E. Gentile 
11225 E. Gentile 

















| $181,336.88 J 
$178,259.59 | 
| $163,350.24 | 
| $164,464.68 | 
| $95,855.00 | 
| $122,500.00 | 
| $124,850.00 J 
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1 Lot 208 Peacefield | $136,000.00_ J&55J536.00J $80,464.00 | 
57. The Court finds that both of the parties residences have no first mortgages 
though the Respondent's residence has a second mortgage with Washington 
Mutual in the sum of $35,000, but also that the Respondent increased the 
mortgage by $20,047 after the separation of the parties without the knowledge or 
approval of the Petitioner. 
58. The Court finds that the Respondent has testified that the monies were used to 
offset the various wrestling and personal expenses of the Respondent and the 
children. 
59. The Court finds that the value of the Respondent's home to be $120,750, as 
agreed to by the parties, and that the value of the Petitioner's home to be 
$122,500 as stipulated by the parties in open Court. 
60. The Court finds that there exists equity in the Respondent's home located at 111 
East 900 South, Layton, Utah, in the sum of $85,855, and in the Petitioner's 
home located at 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, in the sum of $122,500. 
61. The Court finds that the parties have no mutual debts with the exception of the 
joint mortgages owed to Bank of America on the four four-plexes. 
62. The Court finds that the Respondent has requested reimbursement for the sum 
of $120,000 for his inability to utilize the "buddy passes" that the Respondent 
believes that he was entitled to from 1999 up through trial. He has also 
requested reimbursement for $60,000 for the lack of his ability to fly which the 
Respondent has asserted he has enjoyed the benefits of from during the course 
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of the parties' marriage though he cannot show actual monetary loss. 
63. The Court finds that the Respondent has testified that he has incurred the sum of 
$41,500 as and for expenses for the boys' wrestling costs, costs of travel, and 
for the Respondent's costs of travel and expenses as the boys' coach. The 
Court has given the Respondent credit for this sum in an equitable adjustment. 
64. The Court finds that the Respondent has asserted costs for putting the minor 
child in the Olympus Gymnastics School, without the agreement of the Petitioner, 
in the sum of $4,500, which he has paid. 
65. The Court finds that the Respondent has asserted other claims for 
reimbursement including insurance, medical insurance, medical expenses. 
66. The Court finds, as it pertains to wrestling costs and expenses and gymnastics 
costs and expenses, that even though the parties' minor children had 
participated in those activities for years, the Court finds that there was no 
agreement for the parties to split the costs and the Court finds that it would be 
disproportional based upon the parties' income to expect the Petitioner to pay 
one-half. The Respondent had a greater capacity to pay for the children's 
expenses and therefore calls it even based on their ability to pay. 
67. The Court finds that the Petitioner has also incurred expenses associated with 
medical, dental and wrestling costs in the sum of $18,500 even though the 
Petitioner has testified that she is not seeking reimbursement, but rather that the 
parties pay their own costs and expenses. 
68. The Court finds that the Petitioner has accrued the following retirements with 
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definitive cash amounts: 
Delta Family Care Savings Plan $18,166.98 
American General Financial $3,052.16 
Delta Sky Shares $2,340.80 
American Scandia $5,607.32 
TOTAL: $29,617.26 
69. The Court finds that the Respondent has accrued the following retirements and 
definitive cash amounts: 
Thrift Savings Plan $43,220.00 
Traditional IRA $16,390.00 
Federal Employees $5,531.00 
TOTAL: $64,141.00 
70. The Court finds that there is a difference of $35,524, which the Petitioner should 
be awarded a one-half (1/4) interest in ($17,762). 
71. The Court, in reviewing the various properties and equities of the parties, the 
retirements, and having calculated the various offsets finds that there is a 
difference in which the Petitioner should be reimbursed by the Respondent the 
amount of $106,704 from the Respondent for a total of $106,704 that the 
Respondent owes the Petitioner. 
72. The Court finds that, based upon the agreement of the parties, if the Petitioner 
has additional retirement with Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be 
entitled to a credit for his one-half {V2) interest. The Respondent represented 
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that he sent a subpoena requesting the records. 
73. The Court finds that the parties should refinance their various properties to 
remove the other party from the obligation, and the parties should be required to 
execute the necessary Quitclaim Deeds or other documents to effectuate the 
Court's order, subject to easements of record, which shall include easements of 
record. This Finding shall not be considered res judicata in the event either party 
brings further action to clarify and/or address issues regarding historical usage 
and recognition of easements. 
74. The Court finds that the parties will make a good faith effort within 90 days to 
refinance the properties in order to remove the other parties' names and to 
attempt to pay out the amount of money the Respondent owes the Petitioner in 
the sum of $106,704 as a property and retirement adjustment. Both parties are 
to attempt a good faith effort. In the event the parties are unable to refinance at 
the same or better rate of 6.75%, the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the 
sum of $25,000 plus interest at the rate of five percent (5%) on the 120th day of 
this hearing with $25,000 plus interest each and every year thereafter for a 
period of two (2) years, and on the third year, the entire balance will be due and 
payable. 
75. The Court finds that, based upon an agreement of the parties made in open 
Court, each party will keep their own checking and savings accounts in their 
possession. 
76. The Court finds that the Respondent shall be awarded the 1991 Jeep and the 
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1987 Ford Truck subject to the indebtedness thereon, and that the Petitioner 
shall be awarded the 1991 Toyota Camry subject to the indebtedness thereon, if 
any. 
77. The Court finds that a restraining order shall be entered restraining either party 
from denigrating the other, or allowing a third party to denigrate the other party in 
front of the parties' minor child, Skyelee. 
78. The Court finds that, based upon Dr. Davies' recommendation, the primary 
religion for the child shall be Lutheran, but this does not prevent the Petitioner 
from taking the child to LDS services when it is her parenting time. 
79. The Court finds that even though certain activities involving the entire family had 
been previously attended such as Christmas Eve mass, but based upon the 
recommendation of Dr. Davies and the best interest of Skyelee, the Respondent 
may take the child to midnight mass when it is his Christmas Eve, but the Court 
will not require the Petitioner to do so on her Christmas Eve. Skyelee will be 
allowed to go to church and family functions with the parent she is with for that 
day. 
80. The Court finds that if there are conflicts between religious activities, then the 
Lutheran religious activities will be given preference. The Court finds that a 
church hay ride, picnics, or other activities, which the Court considers social 
activities, shall not take priority over the visitation time of the Petitioner. 
81. The Court finds that the Bible School is an important aspect for Skyelee, and if it 
is the desire of Skyelee to attend, then her preference should be accepted and 
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the parties should try to accommodate her wishes by working her visitation 
around that activity. For other significant religious functions or ceremonies, the 
parties shall work through the Special Master and Angela Jackson. 
82. The Court finds that both parties have requested contributions for their attorney's 
fees, and that the parties stipulated that they may submit affidavits of fees and 
reserve and issue to determine if a need existed. However, the Court finds that 
based upon the property division that each party should be required to pay their 
own fees and costs incurred herein, including attorney's fees, appraisal fees and 
mediation fees. 
83. The Court finds that the tax exemption for Skyelee shall alternate each year with 
the Respondent claiming her in 2004 so long as he is current on his child 
support. 
84. The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent shall be awarded a 
divorce based on irreconcilable differences arising during the marriage. 
85. The Court finds that the primary residence of Skyelee at the present time shall 
be designated as the Respondent's. This may be reviewed in the future. 
86. The Court finds that the Petitioner will pay the $1,000 owed to North Davis 
Gymnastics. 
87. Both parties currently maintain the minor children on their health insurance. 
Each party shall continue to maintain the children and each party shall pay one-
half (1/4) of any non-covered medical, dental, or orthodontic expenses for the 
minor children. 
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88. The Court finds that the parties have agreed to a settlement that the Petitioner 
withdraws her claim to alimony and that alimony will not be awarded to Petitioner 
and that the Petitioner will waive any future claim to alimony as part of this 
settlement. Petitioner may keep the two burial plots currently owned by her, and 
the Respondent waives any future claim to the buddy passes the Petitioner 
receives from her employment at Delta Air Lines. The Court finds that the 
parties agreed to this in open Court. 
89. As a matter of the Petitioner's employment, the Court finds that Skyelee receives 
six (6) "S2" priority vacation passes each year and that the passes are forfeited if 
not used by the Petitioner's employment anniversary date. The Respondent is 
not to utilize these passes during the periods of time that he is traveling with 
Skyelee, and will not be allowed to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to an "S2" 
vacation pass. However, the Petitioner is encouraged to make the "S2" passes 
available to the Respondent is she does not intend to use them. 
90. The Court finds that in addition to normal entry documentation for international 
travel, the child is under 18 years old and must have a written notarized 
statement from the other parent to travel internationally. The Court orders both 
parties to cooperate in providing a written notarized statement to allow Skyelee 
to travel. 
91. The Petitioner will not disrupt Skyelee's flight schedule while she is flying with the 
Respondent, and shall not make negative comments on Delta's Flight System 
regarding the minor child or the Respondent. 
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The Court finds that the parties have agreed to follow the standard parent-time 
schedule for the purposes of determining holiday visitation. That the 
Respondent will follow the Odd year schedule and the Petitioner will follow the 
Even year schedule. That Halloween and Valentine Days will alternate by the 
parents. In the event of conflict with vacation plans, Respondent's plans will 
prevail in the even years, and the Petitioner's plans will prevail in the odd years. 
The Respondent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years, and the even 
year holidays in the odd years. 
The court finds that the Respondent should be awarded Lot 208 Peacefield and 
1225 East Gentile (raw land) as his sole property. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters its Conclusions of 
CONCLUSIONS 
The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from each other, which 
divorce should become final and absolute upon signing by the Judge and filing 
with the Davis County Clerk's Office. 
The terms, provisions, and conditions contained in the parties' Findings of Fact 
should be included as part of the Court's Decree of Divorce. 
Let judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this ^ ' g H day of Qu>^ , 2006. 
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. r^vjxsb. UC 
G[en R. Dawson 
District Court Judge 
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Mailing Certificate 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of , 2006, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following individual(s): 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Exhibit E 
STEVEN R.BAILEY #0174 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2454 Washington Blvd. 




IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
[ Civil No.: 994701467 
; Judge Glen R. Dawson 
The Court having entered its Supplemental Findings, now makes and 
enters the following Supplemental Order: 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent be awarded his Woodward 
share of the Petitioner's defined benefit pension plan known as the Delta Family-
Care Retirement Plan through Delta Air Lines, Inc. through April 20, 2004, the 
date of the trial, consistent with the other retirement divisions made by this Court; 
«co(li«MM> '- ^ 
" " * LAM A N O ,8R W N C 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondent will pay all costs incurred for 
use of any tickets for Skyelee, both national or international, when Skyelee 
travels with the Respondent; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties will cooperate in obtaining the 
paper tickets for international travel; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party will pay their own attorney's fees. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ 0 3 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable 0er\ yBUTHyn . , , 
District Courl Ju j r f lg«SSu\ <i \ 
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT ABOVE-NAMED: V - ^ k O ^ T - ' f /, 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial AdminisTtariioB^you are 
hereby notified that the undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of 
eight (8) days from the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient 
time to file any written objections to the Supplemental Decree of Divorce of the 
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections 
to the form are filed within that time, the original hereof will be submitted to the 
Court for signature and filing. 
DATED this tf* day of August 2006. 
EVEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
day of August 2006,1 mailed, via the 
United States post office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE, to the following: 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Sharon A. Newman, Legal Assistant 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Lamano vs. Lomono 
Civil No. 994701467 
Exhibit D 
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Brad C. Smith, Utah State Bar No. 6656 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
1 j 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT - STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No: 994701467 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Notice is hereby given that Brian C. Lamano, Respondent in the above-entitled 
action hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the judgment entered in favor of 
Petitioner in this matter on the 28th day of August, 2006. 
DATED this \°i day of September. 2006. 
4"UyvZ^ 
Jrad C. Smith 
Attorney for Respondent 
VD19224861 
994701467 LAMANO.BFUAN C 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing pleading by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, this /*f day of September, 2006, to the following: 
Steven R Bailey 
Attorney at Law 
2454 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Exhibit F 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Tel: (801) 394-4573 
Fax: (801) 399-9954 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
CONCERNING PETITIONER'S 
RETIREMENT PLAN 
Civil No. 994701467 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
COMES NOW Respondent, by and through his undersigned attorney, and 
moves this Court to schedule an ediventiary hearing to address off-sets for Petitioner's 
Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan. More specifically, Respondent requests an off-set 
to the property settlement for Petitioner's undisclosed retirement benefits. A 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of this motion is filed concurrently 
herewith. _ _. „ „ 
VD18558147 
994701467 LAMANO.BRIAN C 
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DATED this /S day of July, 2005. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this \v day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, to the following 
individual: 
Steven R. Bailey 
2454 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Tel: (801) 394-4573 
Fax: (801) 399-9954 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vo, 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR HEARING CONCERNING 
PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT PLAN 
Civil No. 994701467 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
This matter came before the Court in the parties1 December 2004 hearing. 
Respondent represented to the Court that he was trying to gain information regarding 
Petitioner's Delta Family Care Retirement Plan, an account which Petitioner 
represented to the Court as non-existent. 
On 17 March 2005, Respondent's former counsel received the attached letter, 
which establishes that Petitioner does in fact have an account with the Delta Family 
Care Retirement Plan, which is fully vested. (Exhibit A.) In the prior hearing, the 
parties stipulated that Petitioner's interest in this account would be an offset against the 
property settlement. (Exhibit B, Hearing Transcript, pp. 53-56.) 
Memorandum of Dointe and aiith^r.-«:A» • ^ , 
I lllll llllliimiIIIIIinai.iT-i•.mVr-.?...- s m suPPort of n 
VD18558149 
Respondent has retained an actuary who has estimated the present value of the 
Delta Family Care Retirement Plan as $100,326.00. (Exhibit C, Actuarial opinion.) The 
present value of this plan is an offset as previously stipulated by the parties. 
Respondent has searched his records to identify any other previously undisclosed 
retirement benefits to which he may be entitled and has found none. (Exhibit D, 
Affidavit of Brian Lamano.) Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to an offset of 
$50,163.00, 50% of the present value of Petitioner's Delta Family Care Retirement plan. 
Respondent has already paid over to Petitioner the sum of $101,818.85. Respondent 
was obligated to pay Petitioner the sum of $106,704.00. Accordingly, Respondent is 
entitled to an order directing Petitioner to return the sum of $45, 277.85. Respondent 
further requests a hearing to address the issue. 
DATED this / 5 day of July, 2005. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
By: /n**^/JlvU2£-
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
2 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this r day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the 
following individual: 
Steven R. Bailey 
2454 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Exhibit A 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
Employee Service Center 
Department 951 
Post Office Box 20706 
Atlanta, Georgia 30320-6001 
March 17,2005 
Mr. Robert A. Echard 
Attorney for Respondent 
2491 Washington Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
RE: Pamela A. Lamano, EMP# 088346400 
Dear Mr. Echard: 
Pursuant to a subpoena concerning participation in the Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan, the 
following is provided. 
Pamela A. Lamano has met the 100% vesting requirement (completion of 5 years of credited service) 
under the Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan (a defined benefit pension plan). For purposes of this 
benefit calculation, benefit accruals include total participation in the Plan from the Delta seniority date 
of August 5,1987 through February 28,2005. It is assumed that Single-Life annuity payments are to 
be made for the Participant's lifetime only. The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1,2019 is in 
the amount of $727.29. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. does not compute the "present value" or the "marital portion" of a retirement 
benefit from the Plan. The Plan is a defined benefit plan which is entirely employer funded, and 
neither requires nor allows employee contributions. Any present value or marital portion would have 
to be determined through an outside source, such as a pension actuary. 
Enclosed is a copy of the Summary Plan Description, Administrative Procedures for Processing 
Domestic Relations Orders and our model order. If you have any questions, please contact the 





Employee Service Center 
enclosures 
X:lm 
c: Pamela A. Lamano 
Exhibit B 
CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 9,94701467 
Judge Glenn R. Dawson 
December 9, 2004 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
GARCIA fcf LOVE 
COURT REPORTING AND VlDEOGflRPHV 


























MR. ECHARD: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: He's going to draft this one. 
Mr. Echard is drafting this one. 
MR. BAILEY: He (inaudible) short memory. 
THE COURT: It's basically--
MR. ECHARD: I'm just going to say you found 
that neither party is in contempt, the legitimate--do 
what you said here. And then in addition to that, that 
we entered into an agreement that both parties would 
execute Quit-Claim Deeds in the current legal 
descriptions. We'll give those to him now and 
Mr. Bailey will hold the others and release them as 
necessary in the refinancing of the two properties for 
the $106,000. 
THE COURT: Within 90 days? 
MR. ECHARD: Within 90 days. 
THE COURT: Or the judgment at the amounts--
MR. LAMANO: Now, there's one more thing. 
MR. ECHARD: What's that. 
MR. LAMANO: The Delta family care retirement--
MR. ECHARD: No, no, no. We're dealing with 
that later. 
MR. LAMANO: No. It was an offset to the 
$106,000. And if it--we haven't received information. 
We're trying to get a subpoena on the Delta family care 
53 
retirement. The Court ordered an offset if there was 
any monies in retirement. 
MR. ECHARD: Let me tell you about the status, 
Your Honor. We issued a subpoena, because they 
represented there wasn't any and indicated we could 
subpoena. We issued a subpoena. They said they were 
transferring it, somebody else was managing it. They 
didn't know if there was money there or not. 
The company we issued a subpoena to, they 
didn't answer. I'm issuing another subpoena. We don,'t 
know if there will be any or will not be any. I know 
that you don't agree, Brian, but I don't think that can 
hold up this transaction. 
THE COURT: That wasn't in your order to show 
cause, was it? I don't remember that. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. 
MR. BAILEY: It was mentioned. What it is, 
Your Honor, is--
THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. 
MR. BAILEY: --(inaudible) family profit 
sharing plan. That was rolled over by (inaudible) at 
the end of 2003, just shortly before the first trial was 
continued, to Fidelity, managed by (inaudible). 
(Parties talking at the same time, inaudible.) 
MR. BAILEY: It is the same plan. That's our 
54 
1 position. We don't know of any other retirement. 
2 Mow, on the record it says if a retirement with 
3 T-Mobile, there is an offset. If there's another 
4 account, and it isn't the same account that was rolled 
5 over, we're happy to give credit. 
6 THE COURT: As an offset? 
7 MR. BAILEY: Yeah. If there's another account 
8 that's not the same account that was rolled over. They 
9 want to count it twice. 
10 MR. ECHARD: We've issued a subpoena and 
11 hopefully we'll know. If we don't, you can't tie this 
12 up. I'm issuing the subpoena and we hope to know in 
13 that time--
14 THE COURT: Well, I guess if the time has 
15 passed, then you end up getting a judgment for the 
16 amount of the one-half. 
17 MR. BAILEY: Well, we can address that. We're 
18 not here to hide anything. We're here to be straight 
19 up, as Mr. Echard is, on this. We would represent 
20 affirmatively to the Court there is no other retirement. 
21 MR. ECHARD: That's already (inaudible). And 
22 we're just following up on the subpoena and we're 
23 getting a hard time from the company. But we're doing 
24 the best we can. 



























seven, eight months, and I just hate to--
MR. ECHARD: I agree. 
THE COURT: I mean, if you get something within 
the 45- to 90-day period that we're contemplating here, 
then we can readdress it. Otherwise, it would probably 
have to be addressed in some sort of judgment. 
MR. ECHARD: And we can get it done. 
Mr. Bailey and I already know what the Court's order is 
and we can solve it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you need any further 
direction on today's order? 
MR. ECHARD: I don't think so, except if I 
understand correctly, once we work through the findings 
and decree if we have two or three things that--which we 
are in dispute, we can have a phone conference with Your 
Honor and--
THE COURT: You bet. You bet. And the parties 
to bear their own attorney's fees. 
MR. BAILEY: And the interest would start in 90 
days or start now? 
THE COURT: In 90 days. That's--that's what we 
had ordered before. And based on the testimony I've 
heard today, I think it's best that we just take a fresh 
start as of today. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
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Exhibit C 
Morgan Actuarial Services, Inc. ptmemm.70% 
2225 ES/KmayHo^Rd.,#lG6 Fax801.273.6744 





Dear Mr. Lamano, 
As you requested, we have calculated the present value of retirement benefits earned by your wife 
from the Delta Family Care - Retirement Plan. In determining the present value of benefits, we 
relied without audit on the information that you provided for benefit amounts and participant data. 
The benefit provided by the plan administrators was $727.29 per month payable for the life of 
Pamela Lamano beginning at age 65. The present value of this monthly payment as of May 1, 
2005 is $53,096. The present value was calculated using an interest rate of 4.78% and post-
retirement mortality based on the 1994 Group Annuity Reserving Table blended and projected as 
defined by Revenue Ruling 2001-62. The interest and mortality used are based on fee statutory 
requirements for calculating minimum lump sums as defined in IRC section 417(e). 
The ultimate benefit payable from a defined benefit plan of this nature is heavily dependent upon 
the participant's earnings in the years immediately preceding retirement The plan administrator 
does not appear to have taken into consideration future salary increases when calculating the 
monthly benefit Taking future salary increases into consideration we have estimated the value of 
the benefit, with service through February 28,2005, to be $100,326i 
The plan administrator did not provide calculation details or participant data with the benefit 
amount For purposes of estimating the impact of future salary increases we estimated the current 
average salary to be $35,500 and the Social Security benefit payable at age 65 to be $14,429. The 
current average salary is projected to age 65 using a 4% salary scale. 
Please contact us if you have any questions or if you need any additional information. 
Sincerely, 
Patrick I Mele, MAAA, EA 
Consulting Actuary 
Exhibit D 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Tel: (801) 394-4573 
Fax: (801) 399-9954 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT 
PAMELA A. LAMANO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. LAMANO, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN LAMANO 
Civil No. 994701467 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
COMES NOW Affiant, Brian C. Lamano, having been duly sworn, and on his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My name is Brian C. Lamano. I am the Respondent in the above-entitled action. 
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. In conjunction with this case, I have fully searched my records and disclosed all 
of my assets throughout the course of discovery. 
3. To my knowledge, I have no interest in any property, other than that previously 
1 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORA! 
ATTORNEYS A T LAW 
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403 
TELEPHONE (801) 394-4573 
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